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Islamophobic conspiracism and neoliberal
subjectivity: the inassimilable society
S. JONATHON O’DONNELL
ABSTRACT O’Donnell analyses the conﬂuence of Islamophobia and anti-government
conspiracy theory in the works of the far-right think tank, the Center for Security
Policy (CSP). He argues that, rather than only being a contemporary form of the
religious and racialized demonologies that code ‘Islam’ as being the constitutive
outside of ‘the ‘West—irrational, religious and authoritarian versus rational, secular
and democratic—Islamophobic conspiracism should also be examined in the
context of anxieties over the erosion of personal and state sovereignty under
neoliberalization. Mobilizing an Islamophobic demonology that constructs
‘Muslims’ as inassimilable to ‘American’ subjectivity, the CSP’s Islamophobic
conspiracism projects this construction of absolute alterity on to American social
and state systems. In doing so, O’Donnell contends, Islamophobic conspiracism
takes neoliberalization’s estrangement of the state and its citizens to its logical
conclusion, transﬁguring the societal processes that impact on the freedom of the
individual—notably the state and civil society—into something inassimilable to that
individual’s claims to self-ownership and self-mastery.
KEYWORDS autonomy, Center for Security Policy, conspiracism, Islam, Islamophobia, law,
Muslims, neoliberalism, sharia, sovereignty, subjectivity
‘In hell’, Grant Gilmore concludes his 1977 legal treatise The Ages of AmericanLaw, ‘there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously
observed’. Writing against what he saw as the ‘mechanistic process[es]’ of
legal formalism, in which law curbs societal ills through prescriptive adher-
ence to certain behaviours, Gilmore grounds this assertion in the claim that
law reﬂects but does not determine a society’s morality. For him, the better
a society is, the less law; the worse, the more. ‘In heaven’, he thus claims, refer-
encing a Utopian image adapted from Isaiah 11:6, ‘there will be no law, and
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the lion will lie down with the lamb’.1 Rather than having harmony imposed
upon it, the lion freely chooses to lie beside the lamb, and it is the possibility of
this act of autonomous will that for Gilmore not only guarantees true peace
and prosperity but forms the condition of possibility for freedom itself. By
contrast, hell lacks any such autonomous potential: it must follow its processes
without exception, unable to suspend the mechanisms of its operations or
transcend the conditions of its possibility.
Gilmore’s parable may encapsulate a problematic at the heart of contempor-
ary American political and cultural life. The constitutional theorist Paul
W. Kahn cites it in his Political Theology: ‘we understand his point’, he states,
proceeding to chastise liberal political theory for failing ‘to recognize the char-
acter of freedom upon which modern [American] politics has rested’. In
Kahn’s narrative, this ‘character of freedom’ is linked to the US Constitution
and the popular sovereignty understood as authoring it. This connection, he
claims, makes ‘Americans . . . resist international law’ because it is produced
by bureaucratic and technocratic legislative bodies, and so lacks a true bond
to popular sovereign will. It is thus not a ‘political arrangement within
which America can survive as a nation’.2 Kahn has been properly criticized
for the universalisms underlying his argument, which ﬁgures the American
social imaginary as identical for all Americans.3 Yet the conﬂict he discerns
in Gilmore’s parable may nonetheless underlie a speciﬁc—sometimes domi-
nant, often dominating—strand of both American politics and American reli-
gion. Found in Reinhold Niebuhr’s liberal Protestantism and the
neoconservative politics of George W. Bush alike, this strand distrusts the
state as the enabler of social virtue, placing the task of ameliorating suffering
in the hands of individuals and through them—perhaps paradoxically—’the
coercion and management of sovereign and executive powers’.4
This paper interrogates this strand of American religio-politics as it has
become manifest in a conﬂuence of two contemporary cultural paradigms.
These are, on the one hand, Islamophobia (and the speciﬁc ways that it is
articulated in the public sphere) and, on the other, a mistrust of governmental
(particularly federal) systems and structures that often manifests in anti-gov-
ernment conspiracist discourses. While Islamophobia and conspiracism arise
from different genealogies and articulate distinct discursive frameworks, they
have merged in several contemporary conspiracy beliefs that proliferated in
1 Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law, 2nd edn (New Haven, CT and London: Yale
University Press 2014), 99, 97–8. Against the absolutist faith in legal societal reforma-
tion, puriﬁcation or salvation, Gilmore argues, lawyers must cultivate a ‘skeptical rela-
tivism’ in which law is ‘more modest and less apocalyptic’ (98).
2 Paul W. Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty
(New York: Columbia University Press 2011), 38, 158, 10.
3 See, for example, Or Bassok, ‘How to investigate the social imaginary’, Jerusalem Review
of Legal Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, 2012, 2–11.
4 Michael Northcott, ‘“An angel directs the storm”: the religious politics of American neo-
conservatism’, Political Theology, vol. 5, no. 2, 2004, 137–58 (141–2).
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the wake of Barack Obama’s 2008 election: that Obama was/is secretly Muslim
and/or abetting Islamist terrorists, and that the Muslim Brotherhood is inﬁl-
trating and co-opting the legislature and judiciary of the US government as
part of a ‘civilization jihad’, to name the most prominent.5 Exploring these
conﬂuences of Islamophobia and conspiracy belief, the article argues that,
rather than only being tied to a racialized, Orientalist archive that ﬁgures
‘Islam’ as the constitutive outside of ‘the West’, contemporary American
Islamophobia should also be understood as a form of anti-government con-
spiracism tied to notions of neoliberal subjectivity and the citizen-state
relations they induce.6 To this end, I analyse a pervasive and pernicious
form of American Islamophobia propagated by the far-right ‘counter-jihadist’
think tank, the Center for Security Policy (CSP), that asserts that the United
States is being overtaken by ‘creeping shariah’ as part of a ‘civilization
jihad’. I contextualize the CSP’s Islamophobia with regards to both a racialized
and Orientalist genealogy that constructs the ﬁgure of the ‘Muslim’ as inassi-
milably foreign to ‘the West’, and also to broader conspiracist discourses that
attempt to mediate between a vision of the neoliberal subject and the societal
and state systems that condition and conduct it. Through suturing Islamopho-
bia to conspiracist frameworks of subjectivity, the article argues, Islamophobic
conspiracism takes the political rationality of neoliberalism to its logical con-
clusion, wherein society is rendered inassimilably foreign to the individual: an
alien body that must be resisted, rejected and reduced to ruin to ensure the
survival of the neoliberal subject.
5 Aaron Winter, ‘My enemies must be friends: the American extreme right, conspiracy
theory, Islam, and the Middle East’, in Michael Butter and Maurus Reinkowski (eds),
Conspiracy Theories in the United States and the Middle East: A Comparative Approach
(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter 2014), 35–58. Tracing links between Islamism and
the American extreme right, Winter highlights how extreme-right conspiracist afﬁ-
nities with Islamists (over, for example, shared antisemitism and antagonism to glo-
balization and secular modernity) that had existed since the post-war period were
eclipsed after Obama’s election by the anti-Islam conspiracies explored here. See
also George Michael, The Enemy of My Enemy: The Alarming Convergence of Militant
Islam and the Extreme-Right (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2006); and the
other essays in Butter and Reinkowski (eds), Conspiracy Theories in the United
States and the Middle East.
6 This conﬂuence of Islamophobia and conspiracism has been explored elsewhere,
notably by Deepa Kumar in Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire (Chicago: Haymarket
Books 2012), and Arun Kundnani in The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism,
and the Domestic War on Terror (London and New York: Verso 2014). Kumar charts the
key ﬁgures and groups in this right-wing Islamophobic matrix, exposing their links to
more mainstream political ﬁgures and wider discourses of Islamophobia. Kundnani,
meanwhile, demonstrates how the ‘Muslim’ of western counter-terrorism discourses
is primarily a phantasmatic ﬁgure. My argument here draws on these works by
Kumar and Kundnani, contextualizing Islamophobic conspiracism in relation to neoli-
beralism and the modes of political rationality it fosters, a context reliant on both the
phantasmatic nature of its ‘Muslims’ and its embeddedness in broader matrices of
Orientalism, racialization and neoliberalization.
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The Islamic conspiracy
‘Instinctively’, beginsone sectionof theCenter forSecurityPolicy’s reportShariah:
The Threat to America, ‘even Americans who are unfamiliar with the term
“shariah” understand that it poses a threat’.7 The source of this observation is
never revealed but it is illustrative of the tone and position adopted by the
report throughout.Written by TeamB II—a reference to a ColdWar era competi-
tive analysis exercise that questioned the validity and effectiveness of détente—
Shariah depicts awar betweenmonolithic and incompatible ideological systems:
‘Islam’ and ‘the West’.8 However, as the quotation suggests, the conﬂict is posi-
tioned as instinctual: it encapsulates but exceeds ideologyandpolitics, becoming
essential and existential. ‘Shariah’ threatens the nation’s sovereign foundations,
the report continues: it is ‘an enemy of the United States Constitution’. Formed
in an act of sovereignwill by ‘We the people’ to secure the ‘natural rights and lib-
erties’ theywere ‘endowed [with] by their Creator’, the Constitution hereﬁgures
the heart of ‘America’. Against the natural endowment and Creator-given liber-
ties that constitute this ‘America’ stands ‘a doctrine that mandates the rule of
Allah over all aspects of society’, an alien law that ‘holds that God did not
create the mind free, but in subservience to the will of Allah’ and so makes the
‘condition of human beings . . . submission to Allah, not freedom’.9 Indeed,
Shariah declares in a stark, single-sentence paragraph: ‘Virtually every provision
of the U.S. Constitution can be juxtaposedwith shariah practices that are in con-
ﬂict with America’s foundational laws.’10
Published in 2010, Shariah is the most comprehensive and arguably inﬂuen-
tial text created by the CSP. Self-styled as ‘Special Forces in the War of Ideas’,
the CSPwas founded as a neoconservative national security think tank in 1988
by Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. Described by the Southern Poverty Law Center as ‘one
of America’s most notorious Islamophobes’, Gaffney is a former member of
the Reagan administration whose recent positions have included national
security advisor to the 2016 Ted Cruz presidential campaign.11 The CSP has
7 Team B II, Shariah: The Threat to America. An Exercise in Comparative Analysis—Report by
Team ‘B’ II (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy 2010), 16. Unless part of an
embedded quotation, in this paper I use sharia to refer to the Islamic system generally,
and ‘shariah’ (in quotation marks) when discussing the speciﬁc concept constructed by
the Center for Security Policy and associated groups or individuals.
8 Ibid., 1. This framing can be tied to broader narratives of encounters between ‘Islam’and
‘the West’, both Islamophobic ones and ones about Islamophobia, that situate current
western antagonisms to Islam as a teleological consequence of a genealogy of hostile
encounters stretching back to the Crusades or Reconquista. This construction has been
adeptly dismantled in Nasar Meer, ‘Islamophobia and postcolonialism: continuity,
Orientalism andMuslim consciousness’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 48, no. 5, 2014, 500–15.
9 Team B II, Shariah, 119–23.
10 Ibid., 121.
11 ‘Frank Gaffney Jr’, available on the Southern Poverty Law Center website at www.
splcenter.org/ﬁghting-hate/extremist-ﬁles/individual/frank-gaffney-jr (viewed 8 Novem-
ber 2017).
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been shunned by mainstream news outlets and key ﬁgures on both the politi-
cal right and left, including the Washington Post, American Conservative Maga-
zine, the Anti-Defamation League, John McCain, Marco Rubio and John
Boehner. This condemnation works to cast the CSP as a fringe group,
outside the operations of normal American politics. The characterization is
true, to an extent. Yet, as Deepa Kumar demonstrates, the think tank acts as
one of the primary sources for anti-Muslim talking points that are then uti-
lized by right-wing politicians, pundits and conservative movements
broadly; efforts to cast such groups as ‘fringe’ thus obfuscate their inﬂuence
on more ‘mainstream’ public and political ﬁgures, and their embeddedness
in wider social discourses of American Islamophobia.12
Recent events, however, have worked to shift the CSP closer to the main-
stream. President Donald Trump used it as a major source to support his
call for an immigration ban on all Muslims entering the United States.13 In a
more conspiratorial vein, in 2012 ﬁve US Congress members—glowingly
referenced in a later CSP report as the ‘National Security Five’—submitted
letters to the inspectors general of ﬁve government departments on the
basis of Shariah’s claims, smearing several White House staffers as Islamist
agents.14 In addition to Trump and the National Security Five, the CSP’s
ideas have also been articulated by the Housing and Urban Development Sec-
retary Ben Carson, 2012 presidential candidate Herman Cain and former
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. As Peter Beinart has recently argued,
although Gaffney was long a pariah in Republican establishment politics,
the Islamophobic positions that the CSP espouses—especially regarding
‘shariah’—found an audience among grassroots conservatives and now,
with Trump’s election, in the White House.15 While direct inﬂuence may be
12 Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire, 159–92; Deepa Kumar, ‘Mediating racism:
the new McCarthyites and the matrix of Islamophobia’, Middle East Journal of Culture
and Communication, vol. 7, no. 1, 2014, 9–26 (22–3).
13 See Joel Gunter, ‘Trump’s “Muslim lockdown”: what is the Center for Security Policy?’,
BBC News, 8 December 2015, available at www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
35037943; Amanda Sakuma, ‘Muslims face alarming pattern of being cast as un-Ameri-
can’, NBC News, 15 July 2016, available at www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/
muslims-face-alarming-pattern-being-cast-un-american-n610436; and Jennifer Bendery
and Amanda Terkel, ‘Huma Abedin attacks by Michele Bachmann condemned by John
Boehner, Marco Rubio’, Hufﬁngton Post, 19 July 2012, available at www.hufﬁngtonpost.
com/2012/07/19/huma-abedin-michele-bachmann_n_1686557.html (all websites viewed
8 November 2017).
14 Center for Security Policy, Star Spangled Shariah: The Rise of America’s First Muslim Broth-
erhood Party (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy Press 2015), 30.
15 Peter Beinart, ‘The denationalization of American Muslims’, The Atlantic, 19 March 2017,
available at www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/frank-gaffney-donald-trump-
and-the-denationalization-of-american-muslims/519954. Trump’s proposed ‘Muslim
ban’ in late 2015 and subsequent election and enacting of a travel ban on designated
Muslim-majority countries generated a surge in journalistic writings on the CSP and
its inﬂuence, including: Scott Shane, Matthew Rosenberg and Eric Lipton, ‘Trump
pushes dark view of Islam to center of U.S. policy-making’, New York Times (online), 1
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waning after the departure of anti-Islam advocates such as Michael Flynn,
Stephen Bannon and Sebastian Gorka from the Trump administration, the
CSP and its ideas nonetheless epitomize and exert a structuring inﬂuence on
right-wing Islamophobia in the contemporary United States.
Since Shariah, the CSP has produced a range of companion texts—mainly in
its multivolume Civilization Jihad Reader Series—that expand on its claims.
These include the claim that refugee resettlement and immigration are
forms of deliberate cultural imperialism, and that interfaith dialogue is a
tool of conversion, as well as alleged exposés of speciﬁc Islamic organizations
and the inﬂuence of ‘shariah’ on the US legal system.16 Many of these texts
exemplify and thus help to elucidate the more virulent strands of Islamopho-
bia in both the United States and Europe.17 Trump’s ‘Muslim ban’, as well as
the demonization of Syrian refugees, take on new meaning in the context of
James Simpson’s The Red-Green Axis, which claims that, amidst fear of jihadist
cells and ‘lone wolf’ attacks, ‘we may be missing the most certain source of
danger: the rise of Muslim migration’ through federal immigration policy
February 2017, available at www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/us/politics/donald-trump-
islam.html; Abigail Hauslohner, ‘How a series of fringe anti-Muslim conspiracy
theories went mainstream—via Donald Trump’, Washington Post, 5 November 2016,
available at www.washingtonpost.com/national/how-a-series-of-fringe-anti-muslim-
conspiracy-theories-went-mainstream–via-donald-trump/2016/11/05/7c366af6-8bf0-11e6-
bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html; Zack Beauchamp, ‘Trump’s counter-jihad: how the
anti-Muslim fringe conquered the White House’, Vox, 13 February 2017, available at
www.vox.com/world/2017/2/13/14559822/trump-islam-muslims-islamophobia-sharia;
and Bryan Schatz, ‘How a crazy idea about Islam went from the fringe to the White
House’, Mother Jones, 11 March 2017, available at www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/
03/trump-gorka-islam-not-religion-islamophobia (all websites viewed 8 November
2017).
16 See Stephen Coughlin, ‘Bridge-Building’ to Nowhere: The Catholic Church’s Case Study in
Interfaith Delusion (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy Press 2015); Center for
Security Policy, Shariah in American Courts: The Expanding Incursion of Islamic Law in the
U.S. Legal System (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy Press 2014); Center for
Security Policy, Star Spangled Shariah; Ann Corcoran, Refugee Resettlement and the Hijra to
America (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy Press 2015); James Simpson, The
Red-Green Axis: Refugees, Immigration and the Agenda to Erase America (Washington, D.C.:
Center for Security Policy Press 2015); and Deborah Weiss, The Organization of Islamic
Cooperation’s Jihad on Free Speech (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy Press
2015).
17 The most thorough analysis of these elements of Islamophobic conspiracism in a Euro-
pean context is Sindre Bangstad, Anders Brevik and the Rise of Islamophobia (London: Zed
Books 2014), although the subject is also covered in Kumar, Islamophobia and the Politics
of Empire and Kundnani, The Muslims Are Coming!. See also Liz Fekete, ‘The Muslim
conspiracy theory and the Oslo massacre’, Race & Class, vol. 53, no. 3, 2012, 30–47;
Nasar Meer, ‘The politics of voluntary and involuntary identities: are Muslims in
Britain an ethnic, racial or religious minority?’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 42, no. 1,
2008, 61–81; and Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, ‘Refutations of racism in the
“Muslim question”’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 43, no. 3–4, 2009, 335–54.
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and asylum programmes.18 Nonetheless, it is the core narrative of Shariah
rather than those of later reports that have had perhaps the widest impact.
At the heart of this narrative is a clash of civilizations: a war not ‘on terror,
for terrorism is merely a tactic’, but ‘of ideas: it is freedom versus tyranny;
liberty versus shariah’.19 As the ‘National Security Five’ incident illustrates,
however, this clash has a conspiratorial component. Both Shariah and the
CSP’s other reports issue a clarion call for the United States to recognize an
unacknowledged threat. The threat is not the weapons of al-Qaida or ISIS
but rather the ‘stealthier means’ by which its operatives, associates, afﬁliates
and sympathizers strive to create ‘a global totalitarian system cloaked as an
Islamic state and called a caliphate’.20 For the CSP, America is engaged ‘in exis-
tential conﬂict with foes that have succeeded . . . in concealing their true iden-
tity and very dangerous capabilities’. These foes are not distant but have
already inﬁltrated the country; the ‘greatest danger’ of groups like al-Qaida
is their ‘singular ability to distract our leadership away from the stealth
jihad aimed at insinuating shariah into our society and legal system’.21 The
key group behind this inﬁltration, Shariah outlines, is the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood.22 ‘Steeped in Islamic doctrine, and already embedded deep
inside both the United States and its allies’, the report claims, ‘the Brotherhood
has become highly skilled in exploiting the civil liberties and multicultural
proclivities of Western societies for the purpose of destroying the latter from
within’.23
18 Simpson, The Red-Green Axis, 7.
19 Weiss, The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Jihad on Free Speech, 11. For an overview
of the inﬂuence of the ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative, see Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, A
Metahistory of the Clash of Civilizations: Us and Them Beyond Orientalism (London:
C. Hurst 2011).
20 Team B II, Shariah, 16, 11, 6. Codings of ‘Islam’as totalitarian ties into broader mutations
of the clash-of-civilizations narrative after the Bush II era, in which liberal writers reﬁ-
gured ‘Islamism’ as a ‘totalitarian political movement’ against which ‘the West’ was
locked in a war for Muslim hearts and minds (Arun Kundnani, ‘Islamism and the
roots of liberal rage’, Race & Class, vol. 50, no. 2, 2008, 40–68). In the publications of
the CSP and associated groups, ‘Islam’and ‘Islamism’ blur and this framing is deployed
as a rationale for stripping Muslims of First Amendment rights by reducing ‘Islam’ to a
political ideology.
21 Team B II, Shariah, 11, 93.
22 CSP’s idea of the Brotherhood vastly exceeds the actual Brotherhood. Shariah lists
almost thirty organizations as being either Muslim Brotherhood fronts or ideological
allies, ranging from Hamas and al-Qaida to the Council of American Islamic Relations
(CAIR) and the Muslim Students Association (MSA). The MSA, founded in 1962–3 at
the University of Illinois, has the dubious honour of being ‘ﬁrst Muslim Brotherhood
entity founded in the United States’, which, although seeming like ‘just another mod-
erate Muslim group working on college campuses’, is underpinned by ‘the same ideo-
logy as deﬁnes the Muslim Brotherhood and al Qaeda’ (Team B II, Shariah, 80, 55–91).
23 Team B II, Shariah, 10. The kind of demonization and conspiratorial assertions pre-
sented here are not uncommon in American political culture. From the 1798–1800 Illu-
minati panic to the League of Nations, Bush I’s ‘NewWorld Order’ and 9/11 ‘Truthers’,
fears of covert networks or illegitimate governance subverting popular sovereignty
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Important to recognize about this conspiracy is the way that it is not merely
conspiratorial but conspiracist in nature. Conspiracism here names a world
view comprised of intersecting ‘conspiracy beliefs’ that posit that ‘an organiz-
ation made up of individuals or groups has acted or is acting covertly to
achieve some malevolent end’.24 As Jeffrey Bale demonstrates, conspiracism
differs from investigative journalism or counter-terrorism—which might
identify and expose localized conspiracies by speciﬁc, limited sets of actors
—by deﬁning the conspiracy as global in reach and transhistorical in scope.
A conspiracist conspiracy is ‘international in its spatial dimensions and con-
tinuous in its temporal dimensions’, virtually omnipotent in its capabilities
and ‘the motive force of all historical change and development’, altering ‘the
course of history, invariably in negative and destructive ways’ in ‘monolithic
and unerring pursuit of its goals’.25 This conspiracist framing is crucial for
understanding the CSP’s Islamophobia. For the CSP, the Muslim Brother-
hood’s inﬁltrations—aided by the ‘submission’ of multiculturalism—are not
a localized conspiracy but rather ‘the 21st Century echo of the centuries-long
subjugation of our European ancestors to Islamic conquest and domination’.26
Indeed, the ‘forces of shariah have been at war with non-Muslims for 1400
years and with the United States for 200 years’, Shariah claims, and, while
‘the most recent campaign to impose this totalitarian code began in the late
20th Century, it is but the latest in a historical record of offensive warfare
that stretches back to the dawn of Islam itself’.27 The United States thus con-
fronts ‘an existential threat’as ‘great . . . as any enemy the nation has ever con-
fronted’.28 Through the tools of ‘civilization jihad’, the CSP contends, this
ancient, unrelenting enemywill destroy ‘the American way of life and the con-
stitutional framework that drives the exceptionalism it sustains’ unless radical
changes are made to both domestic and foreign policy.29 These changes will
reject political passivity and multicultural acquiescence, ﬁnally confronting
have long been a feature of American public life. See Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid
Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Knopf 1965); Bernard Barber, The
Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 1983); Vivien
Hart, Distrust and Democracy: Political Distrust in Britain and America (Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press 1978); J. Eric Oliver and Thomas J. Wood, ‘Con-
spiracy theories and the paranoid style(s) of mass opinion’, American Journal of Political
Science, vol. 58, no. 4, 2014, 952–66; and Joseph E. Uscinsky and JosephM. Parent,Amer-
ican Conspiracy Theories (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 2014).
24 Michael Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America,
2nd edn (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press 2013), 3.
25 Jeffrey Bale, ‘Political paranoia v. political realism: on distinguishing between bogus
conspiracy theories and genuine conspiratorial politics’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 41,
no. 1, 2007, 45–60 (51–3).
26 Team B II, Shariah, 127.
27 Ibid., 16.
28 Ibid., 14.
29 Ibid., 16.
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the ‘unthinkable threat of cultural obliteration via Islamization that is all-too-
familiar to those who know history’.30
This prophesying of imminent perdition is a common feature of American
jeremiads that foretell divine judgement lest the nation mend its ways.31 In
doing so, however, it illustrates how conspiracism both adopts and adapts
apocalyptic conceptions of history. In his inﬂuential A Culture of Conspiracy,
Michael Barkun deﬁnes conspiracism as an understanding of history as gov-
erned by demonic forces, an evil whose locus ‘lies outside the true community,
in some “Other, deﬁned as foreign or barbarian, though often . . . disguised as
the innocent and upright”‘.32 Tying this identiﬁcation of evil to ideas of
history, Brian Bennett argues that conspiracism functions similarly to tra-
ditional Christian discourses of providence, in which God is understood as
guiding history towards fulﬁllment, but in abject form. For Bennett, conspira-
cism represents an ‘inverted providentiality’ in which ideas of God’s control
over history become the hidden, demonic hand of the conspirator.33 In the
twentieth-century United States, apocalyptic and conspiracist fears over the
errant direction of the nation have often adopted anti-internationalist form,
with international bodies such as the League of Nations (and later NATO,
the European Union and the United Nations) symbolizing a threat to Ameri-
can sovereignty and/or the precursor to the End Times empire of the Anti-
christ. In keeping with the enmity to international law already described
above by Paul Kahn, as more ‘ad-hoc alliances’ and ‘unfettered’ national
sovereignty shifted in favour of increasingly circumscribed sovereignties
and greater institutionalized cooperation, international institutions and legal
paradigms (and those supporting and enforcing them) came to ﬁgure existen-
tial threats to the exceptionality and destiny of America.34 The hostility to
30 Ibid., 131.
31 For a survey of the jeremiad tradition in America, see Andrew R. Murthy, Prodigal
Nation: Moral Decline and Divine Punishment from New England to 9/11 (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011).
32 Barkun, A Culture of Conspiracy, 3 (and quoting Stephen D. O’Leary, Arguing the Apoc-
alypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press
1994), 6). Although the causes of conspiracist thinking have been much debated, the
framing of conspiracism as an attempt to identify ‘evil’ is commonplace within conspir-
acy theory scholarship. See, for example, Rob Brotherton, Suspicious Minds: Why We
Believe Conspiracy Theories (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic 2015);
Matthew Gray, Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World: Sources and Politics (London and
New York: Routledge 2010); Richard Landes, Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millen-
nial Experience (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011); Christopher Par-
tridge, The Re-Enchantment of the West. Volume 2: Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization,
Popular Culture and Occulture (New York and London: T&T Clark 2005); and David
G. Robertson, UFOs, Conspiracy Theories and the New Age: Millennial Conspiracism
(London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic 2016).
33 Brian P. Bennett, ‘Hermetic histories: divine providence and conspiracy theory’,Numen,
vol. 54, no. 2, 2007, 174–209.
34 Kahn, Political Theology; Markku Ruotsila, The Origins of Christian Anti-Internationalism:
Conservative Evangelicals and the League of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
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‘globalism’ and the championing of national sovereignty displayed by Trump
in his campaign rallies and presidential speeches—of which his 2017 address
to the UN General Assembly is exemplary—should be placed in this genea-
logy of anti-internationalism, in which cosmopolitan, internationalist and
bureaucratic elites are framed as having stolen the reins of government for
the purposes of subverting the popular will.
Both anti-internationalist mistrust of government and the rise of Islamopho-
bia and xenophobia—discourses that converge in Islamophobic conspiracism
—illustrate anxieties about the legitimacy of existing cultural and political
authorities. Both ﬁgure fears of the subversion of the popular sovereign
will, whether by elite manipulation or by compromising a body politic
ﬁgured in monolithic racial and religious terms. As Bennett has contended,
conspiracism adapts theological frameworks of divine providence but casts
the guiding hand as illegitimate and demonic. In the context of the United
States, this demonological reframing is related to broader anxieties about
democratic popular sovereignty. As Ira Chernus argues, American apocalyp-
tic discourses have often been ﬁxated on differentiating between models of
tyranny and rightful rule. Citing Jonathan Z. Smith’s claim that apocalyptic
discourse emerged from the desire to remove the ‘wrong’ king from the
throne and instal the ‘right’ one, Chernus claims that, at ‘its very beginning,
[the United States] was founded on the bold and explicit claim that the
wrong king was on the throne’. Moreover, the ‘right ruler would be no
longer a king at all, but a president elected by the people’.35 Yet, if the Amer-
ican experiment was founded on the declaration that the only good king was
no king, this rupture with monarchical sovereignty produced new instabil-
ities. Jeffrey W. Robbins captures perhaps the most foundational of these
when he argues that democracy was the ‘political instantiation of the death
of God’.36 Removing the ontological and epistemological foundations of the
ancien régime, Robbins argues, democracy strips the world of its sovereign
guarantor, leaving it with the prospect of no directing will. Under the auspices
of both secularization and democracy, the sovereign will can no longer be
identical to a divine authority or human regent. This transformation creates
University Press 2008), 1, 188–9. For the legacy of this framework for later conservative
Christians and the US Patriot and militia movements, see, among others, Barry
J. Balleck, Allegiance to Liberty: The Changing Face of Patriots, Militias and Political Violence
in America (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger 2015); Barkun, Culture of Conspiracy; Carolyn
Gallaher, On the Fault Line: Race, Class, and the American Patriot Movement (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld 2003); Carolyn Gallaher, ‘Mainstreaming the militia’, in
Colin Flint (ed.), Spaces of Hate: Geographies of Discrimination and Intolerance in the
U.S.A. (New York and London: Routledge 2004), 183–208; and Erin Runions, The
Babylon Complex: Theopolitical Fantasies of War, Sex, and Sovereignty (New York:
Fordham University Press 2014).
35 Ira Chernus, ‘The wrong king: apocalypse and transformation (or not) in the White
House’, Political Theology, vol. 12, no. 6, 2011, 870–93 (873).
36 Jeffrey W. Robbins, Radical Democracy and Political Theology (New York and Chichester,
West Sussex: Columbia University Press 2013), 6.
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the possibility of radical change, of new systems of being and becoming, but
also the possibility that this project of becoming might go awry or be con-
sciously led astray.
Conspiracism gives form to this possibility. Underlying conspiracism
broadly and the Islamophobic conspiracism of the CSP speciﬁcally is the
fear that the sovereign will of ‘the people’might be misled, that a conspiracy
might direct it away from its rightful teleology towards an errant future. As
the next sections of this article will outline, this fear of conspiracy exposes a
tension in the idea of popular sovereignty between, on the one hand, sover-
eign exceptionality and, on the other, the fact that this sovereignty is depend-
ent on the presence of community and on a legal framework that gives that
community its form. This tension—between the sovereignty of subjects and
the wider societal structures that produce and restrict that sovereignty—is
at the core of the CSP’s Islamophobic conspiracism. Analysing the CSP’s dua-
listic construction of ‘Muslim-Shariah’ versus ‘American-Constitution’, I ask
what it might mean for the CSP to have situated ‘shariah’ in the top echelons
of US federal governance, exploring how this image of alterity articulates
existing anxieties over the erosion of self-sovereignty under neoliberalization.
Unpacking how the CSP transcribes an Islamophobic narrative of ‘the West’
versus ‘Islam’ on to a conspiracist framing of state-citizen relations, the
article argues that Islamophobic conspiracism takes the political rationality
of neoliberalism to its logical conclusion, reﬁguring state structures and
societal processes that impact the autonomy of the individual as radically inas-
similable to that individual’s subjectivity.
Bodies of law
For the CSP, ‘shariah’encapsulates what Jeffrey Bale designated as the conspir-
acy’s attempt to alter the course of history in ‘monolithic and unerring pursuit
of its goals’.37 This is accomplished by positing an intrinsic link between
violent jihad and ‘shariah’, and then between ‘shariah’and all Islamic practice,
belief and identity.38 The ‘jihadist imperative that derives from shariah doc-
trine itself’, Shariah claims, means that ‘all who know and actively follow
that doctrine are dedicated to jihad for the purpose of imposing Islamic law
on this country [the USA] and all non-Islamic societies worldwide’. The
result: ‘the enemy at war with the United States is not just al Qaeda, but
37 Bale, ‘Political paranoia v. political realism’, 51.
38 This framing ﬁts into broader hegemonic constructions of ‘Islam’ that emerged after
9/11. As Deepa Kumar demonstrates, these constructions entailed a resurgence of
Orientalist topoi (considered further below), creating a ‘commonsense’ framing that
ﬁgured ‘Islam’—in opposition to ‘the West’—as monolithic, irrational and anti-scienti-
ﬁc, uniquely sexist and the inherently violent wellspring of terrorism: Deepa Kumar,
‘Framing Islam: the resurgence of Orientalism during the Bush II era’, Journal of Com-
munication Inquiry, vol. 34, no. 3, 2010, 254–77.
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also a signiﬁcant percentage of the hundreds of millions of Muslims who are
dedicated to the imposition of shariah on us by violence or by stealth’.39
As noted above, the CSP acts as a key source of many of the Islamophobic
ideas that circulate in contemporary conservative politics. Its constructions of
‘shariah’ are the clearest example. During his 2016 run for the Republican pre-
sidential nomination, for example, Ben Carson declared that all Muslims
should be barred from the presidency due to Islam—whose apparent
essence he situated in ‘shariah’—being incompatible with American values
and principles.40 In 2011 former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich
claimed that ‘shariah’ was ‘a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the
United States’; Gingrich reprised his views in 2016, calling for everyone
from a ‘Muslim background’ to be tested for ‘belie[f] in Shariah’, and deported
if such belief were found.41 In 2012 presidential candidate Herman Cain stated
that there was a covert attempt ‘to ease Sharia law and the Muslim faith into
our government’.42 The CSP’s Shariah contextualizes these and similar state-
ments. In its world view, America’s true enemy is not jihadist terrorism but
rather an ‘Islam’ ﬁgured as both chief vector and embodiment of the
‘shariah doctrine’.
The CSP’s situating of the essence of ‘Islam’ in the ‘shariah doctrine’ and its
coding of all practising Muslims as ‘forces of shariah’ are particularly impor-
tant for understanding contemporary Islamophobia in the United States. As
Neil Gotanda argues—and Gingrich’s call for tests of belief exempliﬁes—in
contemporary America, Muslims are framed through a neat division
between ‘Muslim terrorists’ (who are radically Other, permanently foreign,
inassimilable, prone to ‘disloyalty, espionage, and sabotage’) and ‘good
Muslims’ (who adhere passively to America’s social order by shedding all cul-
tural and religious markers of otherness and/or opposition).43 Even testing
negative for ‘shariah’, however, might not be a guarantor of safety. As Liz
Fekete writes, there is a discursive construction of ‘Muslims who do not
signal their Muslimness (for example, by wearing religious clothing) [as]
39 Team B II, Shariah, 95.
40 Theodore Schleifer, ‘Carson: I can support a Muslim who denounces sharia law’, CNN,
22 September 2015, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/21/politics/ben-carson-
muslim-sharia-law-presidency; Eric Bradner, ‘Carson again explains concerns with a
Muslim president’, CNN, 27 September 2015, available at http://edition.cnn.com/
2015/09/27/politics/ben-carson-muslim-president-sharia-law (both websites viewed 9
November 2017).
41 F. Brinley Bruton and Alexandra Jaffe, ‘Newt Gingrich wants tests for all U.S. Muslims
after Nice attack’, NBC News, 15 July 2016, available at www.nbcnews.com/storyline/
france-truck-attack/newt-gingrich-wants-tests-all-u-s-muslims-after-nice-n609916
(viewed 9 November 2017).
42 ‘Herman Cain: “I would not” appoint a Muslim in my administration’, Fox News, 28
March 2011, available at http://nation.foxnews.com/herman-cain/2011/03/28/herman-
cain-i-would-not-appoint-muslim-my-administration (viewed 9 November 2017).
43 Neil Gotanda, ‘The racialization of Islam in American law’, Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 637, no. 1, 2011, 184–95 (191, 194).
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merely posing as modern, progressive and westernised. They are, in fact,
camouﬂaged, and this makes them the more dangerous’.44 Fekete is writing
here about Europe, but similar patterns are present in the American context.
Shariah devotes considerable space to the idea that Muslims have a religious
duty to deceive non-Muslims if it furthers the cause of ‘Islam’,45 and Islam-
based conspiracies involving Barack Obama often hinged on a covert religious
or ingrained cultural Muslim-ness that made him place ‘Muslim’ (or rather
‘Muslim terrorist’) needs ahead of those of a ‘Real America’ constructed in
racial, religious and often sexual terms.46As sociologists Geoffrey
C. Layman, Kerem Ozan Kalkan and John C. Green acutely observe, ‘in con-
temporary politics, there may be no more effective way to “de-Americanize” a
politician than to suggest that he or she is Muslim’.47
The CSP blames America’s ‘multicultural proclivities’ and targets ‘political
correctness’ and ‘moral relativism’ for effacing patriotism and Christian
faith, driving an ‘identity-decline’ that is helping to facilitate the coming cali-
phate.48 Yet, while the religio-racialized elements of this discourse are impor-
tant, Shariah and related works illuminate another vector in these discourses of
de-Americanization: a legal(istic) one. In the Islamophobic conspiracism of the
44 Fekete, ‘The Muslim conspiracy theory and the Oslo massacre’, 35.
45 This claim rests on a misreading of the concept of taqiyya, by which believers may
conceal their faith if under threat of violence. This misreading is widely deployed in
Islamophobic writings. For example, it is prominent in Joel Richardson’s The Islamic
Antichrist: The Shocking Truth about the Real Nature of the Beast (Los Angeles: WorldNet-
Daily 2009); Robert Spencer’s The Complete Inﬁdel’s Guide to the Koran (Washington,
D.C.: Regnery 2009); and Glenn Beck’s It IS about Islam: Exposing the Truth about ISIS,
Al Qaeda, Iran, and the Caliphate (New York: Mercury Radio Arts 2015).
46 Team B II, Shariah, 57–62; Jason Dittmer, ‘Obama, son of perdition? Narrative ration-
ality and the role of the 44th President of the United States in the End-of-Days’, in
Jason Dittmer and Tristan Sturm (eds),Mapping the End Times: American Evangelical Geo-
politics and Apocalyptic Visions (Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2010), 73–
96 (90).
47 Geoffrey C. Layman, Kerem Ozan Kalkan and John C. Green, ‘A Muslim president?
Misperceptions of Barack Obama’s faith in the 2008 presidential campaign’, Journal
for the Scientiﬁc Study of Religion, vol. 53, no. 3, 2014, 534–55 (535). The racial elements
of this non-belonging are difﬁcult to overstate. As Wendy Brown, among many others,
has argued, democracy has ‘always been limned by a non-democratic periphery and
unincorporated substrate’ that both materially sustains it and against which it
deﬁnes itself: Wendy Brown,‘“We are all democrats now . . .”’, in Giorgio Agamben,
Alain Badiou, Daniel Bensaïd, Wendy Brown, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière,
Kristin Ross and Slavoj Žižek, Democracy in What State? (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press 2011), 44–57 (51). Obama’s election was a symbolic structural inversion of the
racialized and religious underpinnings of the American social contract, symbolizing for
some a reality in which ‘America no longer needed white Americans to reproduce its
structures of power’, leading to the rise of movements whose primary aim is to
return Obama (and via him, America) to his ‘proper’ place: Donald Pease, ‘States of
fantasy: Barack Obama versus the Tea Party movement’, boundary 2, vol. 37, no. 2,
2010, 89–105 (103).
48 Team B II, Shariah, 125–31.
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CSP, the fault line separating ‘Muslim’ from ‘American’—that which allegedly
makes these categories not only differentiated but irreconcilable—is ‘shariah’.
This ‘shariah’ is ﬁgured analogously to a sickness in the US body politic, to be
identiﬁed, isolated and excised before it metastasizes too widely; bodies con-
taminated by it must be expelled for the health of the body politic to be
restored. Yet this ‘shariah’ is, crucially, ultimately phantasmatic. As Irfan
A. Omar writes, ‘shari’a is not law . . . [It] is no different than a set of religious
and ethical teachings as found in other faiths and secular ideologies.’While it
is true that, ‘at social (group) and state (political) levels, rules of governance
(laws) may be derived from shari’a guidelines’, this process is both subjective
and contextual: ‘there is no such thing as standard “shari’a law” that can be
“downloaded” from the Qur’an and applied “as is” in a given society.’49
This point has been made in more certain terms by Wael B. Hallaq, who high-
lights conceptual differences between sharia and structures of western nation-
states to argue that the idea of an ‘Islamic state’ is a contradiction in terms. As
Hallaq contends, classical sharia required the aggregation of juridical, social
and governmental structures under a moral authority: this stance is radically
alien to the modern nation-state, and is one that perhapsmakes modern Islam-
ist state-building ventures structurally impossible.50 Such nuances and com-
plexities notwithstanding, it is only important to note that in the CSP’s
Islamophobic conspiracism ‘shariah’ is both synonymous with law and some-
thing simultaneously standardized, downloadable and applicable ‘as is’. In
Shariah, ‘shariah’ becomes a transcendental authority of which individual
Muslims are rendered little more than avatars.
The Islamophobic construction of Muslims as avatars of the ‘shariah doc-
trine’ represents both the articulation of an archive of racialized, Orientalist
constructions of ‘Muslim culture’, formulated in relation to a (ﬁrst Christian,
later secular) ‘West’, and a reduction of Islamic cultural and juristic systems
to objects that can be named, comprehended and ﬁnally dismissed entirely
in western terms. As Brian Klug notes, Christian polemics has long used the
juxtaposition of the lex talionis found in Exodus 21:23–5 and the Qur’anic
49 Irfan A. Omar, ‘Keeping shari’a and reclaiming jihad’, Political Theology, vol. 12, no. 5,
2011, 706–12 (707–8).
50 Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament
(New York: Columbia University Press 2014). Hallaq’s position here helps illuminate
the CSP’s citations of Islamic and Islamist authors. In Shariah, the CSP deploys quota-
tions from Qu’ranic and Hadith sources, statements by Islamist ﬁgures such as Abul
A’la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna and Ruhollah Khomeini, and the writ-
ings of classical Muslim scholars such as al-Misni, ibn Taymiyya, ibn Rushd, ibn
Khaldun and al-Shaybani to construct an image of unbroken continuity in Islamic/
Islamist thought (45–51). Shariah thus relies not only on the Orientalist fantasy of a
homogeneous ‘Muslim world’ but also on how Islamists have adapted this fantasy
for their own anti-colonial struggles; see Cemil Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World:
A Global Intellectual History (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press
2017). That is, the CSP reﬂects back Islamist reﬂections of the Orientalist fantasy of
Islamic homogeneity.
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Sura 5:45 to Jesus’ teaching to turn the other cheek (Matthew 5:38–9) to create a
persistent binary opposition, ‘with Christianity on the side of the angelic—the
loving, the forbearing, the forgiving—and Judaism and Islam occupying the
other side: the legalistic, the vengeful, the merciless’.51 As such, there has
long been a tendency in the West to ﬁgure Muslims, in Ivan Kalmar’s
words, as ‘slaves, soldiers, and terrorists of Allah: fanatical devotees of a
remote and terrifying sublime power’.52 This ﬁguration is apparent through-
out contemporary Islamophobia, but discourses of sexuality and violence are
exemplary. As Saba Mahmood demonstrates with regard to discourses per-
taining to ‘honour killings’, man-on-woman homicides in the United States
are usually viewed as resulting from individual passions and pathologies,
while ‘honour killings’ are ﬁgured as symptomatic of ‘Islamic culture’:
Muslim men ‘are understood to be compelled by “their culture,” irrationally
and blindly acting out its misogynist customs and traditions’.53 This same
paradigm is present in discourses pertaining to terrorism—not merely in
how terrorism becomes ﬁgured as the unique province of ‘Islam’, but in
how this ‘Islam’ reinforces conceptions of legitimate (political/state) versus
illegitimate (religious) violence. Analysing the US government’s own National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, for example, Jasbir K. Puar contends that not
only is Islamist terrorism viewed as springing fully from religious motives
rather than economic or political grievance, but that religious belief is cast,
‘in relation to other factors fueling terrorism, as the overﬂow, the ﬁnal
excess that impels monstrosity: [a] “different attitude towards violence” sig-
naling these uncivilizable forces’.54
Shariah and its companion texts drink deeply from this Orientalist genea-
logy. The CSP conjures a ﬁgural ‘Muslim’as signalling unreasoned and unrea-
sonable violence, a cultural and legalistic automaton irreconcilable to
American sociopolitical norms.55 In Islamophobic conspiracism, the
51 Brian Klug, ‘The limits of analogy: comparing Islamophobia and antisemitism’, Patterns
of Prejudice, vol. 48, no. 5, 2014, 442–59 (453). As Gil Anidjar has observed, the reinven-
tion of Christianity as ‘Judaeo-Christianity’ permitted the shifting of Judaism to the
other side of this binary pair, assimilating it into the Christian West’s journey
towards secular modernity while relegating ‘Islam’ to the space of enduring (irrational)
religiosity: Gil Anidjar, ‘The forgetting of Christianity’, ReOrient: The Journal of Critical
Muslim Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015, 27–36.
52 Ivan Kalmar, Early Orientalism: Imagined Islam and the Notion of Sublime Power (London
and New York: Routledge 2012), 2.
53 Saba Mahmood, ‘Religion, feminism, and empire: the new ambassadors of Islamopho-
bia’, in Linda Martín Alcoff and John D. Caputo (eds), Feminism, Sexuality, and the
Return of Religion (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 2011), 77–
102 (90).
54 Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, NC and
London: Duke University Press 2007), 55.
55 The ﬁgural nature of this ‘Muslim’ is important. As Klug discusses in relation to the
limits of analogy between antisemitism and Islamophobia (regardless of the analogy’s
use in other respects), the ‘Muslim’of Islamophobia is as much of ‘a ﬁgment, a ﬁgure of
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‘Muslim’ is transﬁgured into an avatar of law and the ‘Muslim’ body into a
body of law. Compelled by ‘shariah’, ‘Muslims’ become ﬁgured as capable
only of working out the processes of their legalistic programming. The only
solution—as Gingrich proclaimed—is thus to test for the presence of this
program and expel those bodies in which it is found. Rather than just being
a form of anti-Muslim prejudice, the CSP’s Islamophobia sees ‘Muslims’ as
threatening precisely because it renders them as mechanistic nodes of a cultural
force named ‘Islam’, not as autonomous subjects of freedom. It articulates, at
least overtly, not a fear of Muslims per se but of the ‘Muslim’ as a modality of
‘Islam’.56 To return to the parable withwhich I began this article, Islamophobic
conspiracism here mirrors the structures underlying Gilmore’s soteriological
parable in Orientalist form: ‘shariah’s’ infernal legalism contrasts the heavenly
freedom enshrined in the Constitution.
Constructed as radically at odds with America’s constitutional essence, the
‘Muslim’ forms ‘America’s’ constitutive and self-consolidating Other in a war
of ‘freedom versus tyranny; liberty versus shariah’.57 Yet, while CSP’s
‘shariah’—as Omar and Hallaq help to contextualize—is phantasmatic, it is
crucial to recognize that so too is the a priori free moral subject that the CSP
opposes to it. As Wendy Brown demonstrates, the promise of democracy is
at root the promise of self-legislation, often coded as the capacity to be
arbiter of one’s own destiny. However, democracy’s normative presumption
is that this ability is ‘attained through shared rule of the polity; the sovereignty
of the subject is linked to the sovereignty of the polity, each securing the
fantasy or myth’ as the ‘Jew’ of antisemitism. Both are social representations of people,
not people as such. Klug, ‘The limits of analogy’, 449–50.
56 As literature on the ties between religion and racialization in Islamophobia demon-
strate, clear distinctions between anti-Islam and anti-Muslim prejudice are impossible
to maintain in an unproblematic way. I seek only to clarify that anti-Muslim prejudice is
herein framed via a reduction of Muslims to infernally legalistic automata pre-pro-
grammed by ‘Islam’ in opposition to the autonomous subject of US liberal democracy.
See Gotanda, ‘The racialization of Islam in American law’; Nasar Meer, ‘Racialisation
and religion: race, culture and difference in the study of antisemitism and Islamopho-
bia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 36, no. 3, 2013, 385–98; Meer, ‘The politics of volun-
tary and involuntary identities’; Meer and Modood, ‘Refutations of racism in the
“Muslim question”’; AbdoolKarim Vakil, ‘Who’s afraid of Islamophobia?’, in
S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil (eds), Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspec-
tives (London: C. Hurst 2010), 271–8.
57 Weiss, The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Jihad on Free Speech, 11. Shariah’s narrative
as ostensibly constructed is one of a totalitarian Islam against the secular social order.
However, it attempts to draw direct links between Christianity and the secular doc-
trines of the US Constitution. The ‘principles of the American founding were derived
from a combination of reason and revelation’, the report claims. Moreover, Team B II
declares, concepts of mutual toleration and the separation of Church and State are
rooted in Christian doctrines, exempliﬁed by Jesus’ statements that one should
‘Submit yourselves for the Lord’s sake to every authority instituted among men’ (1
Peter 2:13) and ‘Render unto to Caesar that which is Caesar’s’ (Mark 2:17): Team B II,
Shariah, 120.
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other’.58 Individual freedom is thus (perhaps paradoxically) contingent on
placement in a community of similarly free subjects. Crucial to recognize
here is that this construction of freedom has normatively been constituted
by reserving it for some and denying it to others: both to an ‘occluded
inside’ in the form of residents marked as alien (slaves, women, the poor,
ethnic and racial minorities, the foreigner, the inﬁdel), and a constitutive
outside in that of the barbaric Other.59 Yet, in addition to this is a problem con-
tained in the very notion of subjectivity on which this vision of liberal demo-
cracy relies: the ‘a priori free moral subject’, one that embodies (in sexed,
gendered, racialized and religious form) the promise of personal freedom
that lies ‘at the heart of the normative supremacy claimed by democracy’.60
This image is that of the classical liberal subject—the liber or ‘freeman’, the
self-lawed, self-sovereign, self-contained subject—and its construction is foun-
dational not only to the ideologies and ediﬁces of western political liberalism,
but also (therefore) to conspiracism.
If theﬁgure of the ‘Muslim’ is foundational to Islamophobic conspiracism, that
of the liber is similarly required, not only for Islamophobic conspiracism but for
conspiracist discourses more broadly. Conspiracism places signiﬁcant emphasis
on notions of intentionalityand agency; it reduces the operations of complex and
often unpredictable social systems to the machinations of speciﬁc unseen
agents.61 This emphasis on agency has often been central to explorations of con-
spiracism’s epistemological or psychological dimensions.62 Here, however, I am
58 Brown, ‘“We are all democrats now . . .”’, 52.
59 AsMaryam El-Shall demonstrates, membership of ‘We the people’ has and continues to
be ﬁgured primarily in terms of a self-ownership understood in racialized and gen-
dered terms: Maryam El-Shall , ‘“Yes, ‘who’ can?” Who “we” are in American liberal
discourse’, Thirdspace: A Journal of Feminist Theory & Culture, vol. 10, no. 1, 2011, avail-
able on the Simon Fraser University website at http://journals.sfu.ca/thirdspace/index.
php/journal/article/view/el-shall (viewed 10 November 2017). See also Julian Go,
‘Myths of nation and empire: the logic of America’s liberal empire-state’, Thesis
Eleven, vol. 139, no. 1, 2017, 69–83.
60 Brown, ‘“We are all democrats now . . .”’, 52.
61 As Gray outlines, this ﬁxation was emphasized by Karl Popper in his defence of the
‘open society’: Matthew Gray, ‘Explaining conspiracy theories in modern Arab
Middle Eastern political discourse: some problems and limitations of the literature’,
Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, 2008, 155–74 (164). It was also
central to Hofstadter in The Paranoid Style in American Politics.
62 Lee Basham, ‘Malevolent global conspiracy’, Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 34, no. 1,
2003, 91–103; Robert Brotherton and Christopher C. French, ‘Belief in conspiracy the-
ories and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy’, Applied Cognitive Psychology, vol.
28, no. 2, 2014, 238–48; Robert Brotherton and Christopher C. French, ‘Intention
seekers: conspiracist ideation and biased attributions of intentionality’, PLoS ONE,
vol. 10, no. 5, 2015, available on the PLoS ONE website at http://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0124125 (viewed 10 November 2017); Jovan
Byford, Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
2011); Matthew R. X. Dentith, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories (Basingstoke: Pal-
grave Macmillan 2014); Mark Featherstone, ‘The obscure politics of conspiracy
theory’, Sociological Review, vol. 48, no. S2, 2000, 31–45.
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interested in its religio-political and sociocultural ramiﬁcations. If, apropos
Robbins, democracy politically instantiates the death of God by removing his-
tory’s sovereign guarantor,63 then conspiracism can be read as an attempt to
mask the resultant fear of directionless (non-telic, ergo meaningless) history.
Exploring the narrative function of conspiracy, Mark Fenster contended that
the ‘unseenhand’of conspiracyacts to resolve the ‘formalproblemof a seemingly
meaningless history’. That is, history remains directed after God’s death, but by
nefarious conspirators, bywhat Brian Bennett identiﬁed as the demonic hand of
inverted providentiality. However, Fenster continues, key to conspiracism is
what followsafter this resolution: if theunseenhand is identiﬁedby the conspira-
cist in the present, then the conspiracy itself must still ‘be revealed, resisted, and
unraveled in the future’.64 Central to images of inverted providentiality, there-
fore, is the possibility of reversal, of the restoration of true teleology determined
by and embodied in popular sovereign will. To defeat the conspiracy and elude
its efforts at deception, its signs must be recognized and the future it signals
rejected. A priori free individuals must reclaim their freedom from those forces
(of ‘shariah’ or otherwise) that would constrain them.
If the Islamophobia in Islamophobic conspiracism is embedded in a genea-
logy of Orientalism and religio-racialized stereotyping, this is inextricable
from its second component: a ‘conspiracism’ grounded in certain conceptions
of liberal subjectivity. As the closing section of this paper will explore, in the
suture between its constitutive halves, Islamophobic conspiracism transcribes
an Orientalist narrative of a clash of civilizations—’the West/America’ against
‘Islam’—on to a conspiracist framing of state-citizen relations. As Hallaq
notes, in liberal democratic political theory the state serves as the material
instantiation of the popular sovereign will, which it crystallizes in a juri-
dico-political code.65 It is this code (the Constitution qua condition of Ameri-
ca’s possibility) that Islamophobic conspiracism constructs as under threat.
For the CSP, inﬁltration by the Muslim Brotherhood had marred both the leg-
islative and judicial branches of the US government; numerous Obama con-
spiracies extended this projection of alterity to the executive. Yet, if there is
no more effective way to ‘de-Americanize’ Americans than to suggest they
are ‘Muslim’, what might it mean for this ﬁgure of inassimilable otherness
to be transposed on to America’s governmental structures: for ‘America’ (at
least at the federal level) to be or have become ‘Muslim’?
The inassimilable society
The CSP’s narrative is founded on an essential and transhistorical clash
between free, sovereign subjects and the forces conspiring to constrain and
63 Robbins, Radical Democracy and Political Theology, 6.
64 Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture, revd edn (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2008), 141.
65 Hallaq, Impossible State, 19–36.
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destroy that sovereignty. However, crucially, this ‘hidden hand’ is also
directed, also willed. For the CSP, it is the Muslim Brotherhood’s hand; for
others, it was Obama’s. Ultimately, however, in the world view of Islamopho-
bic conspiracism, it is all the ‘forces of shariah’—all ‘Muslims’—who are the
co-conspirators, tied together in a plot to subvert and invert the proper provi-
dence of ‘America’. Figured as the spectral image of all ‘America’ is not or
should not be, the CSP positions the ‘Muslim’ and its seditious sympathizers
as ﬁgures that must be purged from the body politic. Only then might the
nation be restored, be exceptional, be (to cite Trump’s campaign slogan)
‘great again’. At the same time, however, the model of alterity that under-
writes this Islamophobic conspiracism highlights the paradox of a vision of
history as a contest of would-be sovereign wills. For if the ‘Muslim’ is an
avatar of ‘shariah doctrine’, an infernally legalistic ﬁgure following its due
processes without exception, then there cannot truly be an agent or will that
is consciously misleading ‘We the people’ towards perdition.
The problematic presented here is often found in conspiracist discourses,
and is one ultimately rooted in the ﬁgure of the liber on which both conspira-
cism and liberal democracy are grounded. As Brown demonstrates, the ‘a
priori free moral subject’ of democratic liberalism is ultimately a ‘conceit’,
one that falls away once we begin to appreciate ‘the panoply of social
powers and discourses constructing and conducting us’.66 Many critical theor-
etical paradigms, including queer, postcolonial and critical race theories, have
arisen to work through this unsettling of subjectivity, but so too has conspira-
cism. As—in Fredric Jameson’s sympathetic reading—a desperate, ﬂawed and
ultimately futile attempt ‘to think the impossible totality of the contemporary
world system’, conspiracism can be read as one attempt to negotiate the
paradox that arises when the conceit of the liber must confront those social
forces that ineluctably condition it.67 Rather than destabilize the subject’s pri-
vileged position, however, conspiracism hardens its boundaries. It reduces
history to a clash of agencies: a popular sovereign will pitted against the
unseen hand of the conspirators. In short, conspiracism reiﬁes the ‘a priori
free moral subject’ of political liberalism by coding all societal forces as mod-
alities of that subject and its actions. Rather than only reﬂecting an imperfect
attempt to rationalize the condition of the subject under the contemporary
‘world system’, conspiracismmight also be framed as the subsuming of all his-
torical processes under the logic of (neo)liberal subjectivity.
The ‘(neo)’ of this (neo)liberalism is important, not just due to the economic
conditions of the subject under contemporary capitalism (Jameson’s ‘world
system’) but rather due to the political rationality that economic neoliberalism
66 Brown, ‘“We are all democrats now . . .”’, 52–3.
67 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press 1991), 38. See also Matthew Gray’s discussion of Floyd
Rudmin’s framing of conspiracy theory as ‘naïve deconstructivist history’ (Gray, Con-
spiracy Theories in the Arab World, 31–2).
S. JONATHON O’DONNELL 19
discursively and materially enables: the transmutation of liberal democratic
subjects into neoliberal ones. Reﬂecting anxieties articulated by anti-interna-
tionalist conspiracists and wider contemporary fears of government surveil-
lance, this mutation of subjectivity serves to heighten and make visible the
structural dependency of self-sovereign, self-contained individuals on the
social structures that constitute them, and thereby compromise their claims
to self-sovereignty and self-containment. Joining the conceit of self-legislating
subjects to the mechanisms of market risk, neoliberal governmentality dissem-
inates sovereignty among increasingly individualized members of society,
outsourcing the pastoral capacities of the state to the (in)action of its subjects
while simultaneously regulating them through highly adaptive regimes of
biopolitics. Filtering individual agencies through networks of coercive regu-
lation that reduce the individual to a node in bureaucratic networks of cost
and beneﬁt, neoliberalism fosters a particular formulation of state-citizen
relations. As Saskia Sassen argues, neoliberal processes of privatization and
globalization, which blur boundaries between states in favour of a solidiﬁca-
tion of borders between individuals in a market democracy, are ‘not just a
matter of shrinking social rights and shrinking state obligations’. Rather, by
reducing ‘the number of relations/interdependencies between citizens and
their states’, such processes foster a disconnect between the state and its citi-
zens and thereby destabilize the democratic notion ‘that state and the
people are one’.68
This conceptual severance of individuals from the societal processes that
produce and inﬂect them (even and perhaps especially when those forces
are denied) is signiﬁcant for understanding contemporary conspiracist cul-
tures, and Islamophobic conspiracism speciﬁcally. As ascendant ethnonation-
alist populisms in the United States and Europe demonstrate, current
de-democratizing processes (enabled by the erosion of state sovereignty, the
borderless ﬂow of capital and the growing disconnect between the state and
its citizens) have become increasingly projected on to democracy’s occluded
insides (foreigners, ethnic, racial and religious minorities) and its constitutive
outside (the barbarian). In the contemporary politico-cultural climate, the
‘Muslim’—at once inside and outside—has become the most frequently
deployed of such projections.69 The Orientalist framing of Muslims as
68 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Prince-
ton, NJ and Woodstock, Oxon: Princeton University Press 2006), 319–20. The rise of
the acceptability of dual citizenship and the growth of professional armies instead of
military service are two examples Sassen identiﬁes: the ﬁrst signals ‘a diffuse shift
away from citizenship as exclusive allegiance to one state’, the second ‘dents hallowed
notions’ that citizens are willing to die for their state, on the one hand, and ‘that a state’s
wars are the people’s wars’, on the other (320).
69 Charting connections between European and American anti-neoliberal ethnonational-
ist populisms is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for relevant discussions of
such movements in the French context, most notably the Front National, see Gabriel
Goodliffe, ‘From political fringe to political mainstream: the Front National and the
2014 municipal elections in France’, French Politics, Culture & Society, vol. 34, no. 3,
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terrifying agents of sublime power, whose condition of possibility is ‘sub-
mission to Allah, not freedom’, herein serves a double role. On the one
hand, the ‘Muslim’ acts as a scapegoat on to which the destructive effects of
neoliberalization can be cast; the inassimilable foreignness of the ‘Muslim’
inside the nation is constructed as the primary cause of the loss (real or ima-
gined) of national sovereignty and economic and sociocultural stability. On
a more ideological level, however, the ‘Muslim’ also serves as the self-conso-
lidating alterity that enables a discourse of American subjectivity as con-
ditional on ‘freedom, not submission’—whether ‘to Allah’ or any other
transcendental authority—thus allowing for the occlusion of neoliberaliza-
tion’s de-democratizing effects broadly. Or, as Brown dryly remarks: ‘the
ﬁgure of “Islamicism” comforts democrats that they are such’.70
Understanding Islamophobic conspiracism as bound up with neoliberaliza-
tion (both in terms of reﬂecting the structural anxieties it evokes and of its sim-
ultaneous reinforcing and unsettling of the subjectivities it produces) permits
a critical reframing of growing right-wing populist movements that join
Islamophobia to (rhetorical, if not always actual) opposition to neoliberal ‘glo-
balism’. Trump’s rhetoric as both candidate and president, if not his policies, is
an illustrative example, combining a conspiracist anti-internationalism, which
accused urban elites of relinquishing national sovereignty and exceptionality,
with an Islamophobic and xenophobic ethnonationalism, which demonized
religious and racial minorities for contravening the alleged ‘purity’ of
(white, Christian/secular) US culture. Despite Trump’s explicit citation of the
CSP, it is impossible to determine any direct inﬂuence the think tank may
have had on the 2016 presidential election. Nonetheless, the links the CSP’s
world view constructs between opposition to neoliberal governmentalities
and Islamophobic ﬁxations on national identity help illuminate the ways
that these paradigms reinforce and destabilize one another. Islamophobic con-
spiracism transposes anxieties over regulatory systems that restrict the auto-
nomy of nations and of those citizens constructed as ‘authentically’
embodying such nations on to racialized, Orientalist discourses that have
already ﬁgured certain populations as being representative of the regulation
and submission of all autonomy. The CSP’s consequent image of the ‘world
system’—a ‘global totalitarian system cloaked as an Islamic state and called
2016, 126–47; Aurelien Mondon, ‘The Front National in the twenty-ﬁrst century: from
pariah to republican democratic contender?’, Modern and Contemporary France, vol. 22,
no. 3, 2014, 301–20; and Jens Rydgren, ‘France: the Front National, ethnonationalism and
populism’, in Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (eds), Twenty-First Century
Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy (Basingstoke and New York: Pal-
grave MacMillan 2008), 166–80.
70 Brown, ‘“We are all democrats now . . .”’, 51. For examples of how western powers use
the spectre of Islam to occlude their systems of inequality through construction of bar-
baric Others, see Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, and Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in
a Secular Age: AMinority Report (Princeton, NJ andWoodstock, Oxon: Princeton Univer-
sity Press 2015).
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a caliphate’,71 wherein popular sovereignty is subsumed into the infernal
regulatory logics of structures that exceed it—reﬂects the neoliberal order
under which parts of the modern United States have languished as much as
it does the caliphate they extract from selective readings on Islamic govern-
ance and Islamist political theory.
To observe this parallel is not to argue that the CSP’s ‘shariah’ is merely a
stand-in for the laws of the market, for globalization or bureaucratization or
the erosion of national and individual autonomies. ‘Shariah’ encompasses
these but it also exceeds them. The Islamophobia of Islamophobic conspira-
cism ties it to a politics of identity, much as the politics of identity have
always dictated who has held the right to be part of ‘We the people’ and
who has been forced to embody the occluded insides and constitutive
outside on which that people feed. In the CSP’s Muslim Brotherhood conspira-
cies, as well as those around Obama’s alleged un-Americanness, it was the
alleged ‘submission’ of an America that had been compromised by ‘multicul-
tural proclivities’ that led to the porosity of its borders and the election of a
commander-in-chief who denied the exceptionality of the nation. It was this
alleged ‘identity decline’ that permitted an elision of ‘freedom’ into
‘tyranny’, ‘liberty’ into ‘shariah’, and ‘America’ into ‘Islam’. This politics of
identity—as much as the effects of neoliberalization—is fundamental to Islam-
ophobic conspiracism, which thus cannot be reduced to a xenophobic super-
structure built on a base of material insecurities and economic anxieties.
What marks the CSP’s Islamophobic conspiracism as distinctive and illumi-
nating for America’s present moment is not its constitutive halves but rather
what emerges from their union. The CSP’s conspiracism combines a vision
of essential, irreconcilable difference between ‘America’ and ‘Islam’ with one
that constructs abstract societal systems—especially governmental ones—as
at best suspect and at worst evil. It not only points towards a foreign alterity
to mask the instabilities and imperfections in an American selfhood (although
it does do this), but takes this ﬁgure of radical alterity (the ‘Muslim’) and trans-
poses it on to the structures of American society and neoliberalized govern-
mentality. Suturing Islamophobia to conspiracism’s imperfect attempts to
mediate between the ‘a priori free moral subject’ of political liberalism and a
societal order that comprises and compromises that subject’s claims to
freedom, Islamophobic conspiracism might be said to take neoliberalization’s
estrangement of the state and its citizens to its logical conclusion. It transﬁg-
ures the societal processes that impact on the freedom of the individual
(here, the state and civil society) into something radically inassimilable to
that individual’s subjectivity. Societal processes become not the foundation
of the subject’s autonomy—a sovereign polity that secures a sovereign
subject—but its antithesis, as that which must be rejected or even destroyed
for the preservation of the liber and its arbitration of its own destiny. The
ﬁgural image of the Islamic State constructed by the CSP and those that its
71 Team B II, Shariah, 6.
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texts inspire constitutes the quintessential image of this inassimilable society.
Terrifying and totalitarian, this IS symbolizes the end of all sovereign capacity,
of the exception as tied to American exceptionality. Under its legalistic pro-
cesses there can be no possibility of paradise, no liberty for the lion to
choose freely to lie down with the lamb, only the slow, meticulous procedures
of a system without exceptions, that cannot suspend the mechanisms of its
operations or the conditions of its possibility.
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